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Introduction 
CHRISTIAN REUS-SMIT 
The first half of the twentieth century saw multiple crises in the 
expanding international system, characterised most tragically and 
dramatically by two world wars, the Great Depression, and the Holocaust. 
In response, the international community engaged in history’s most 
ambitious program of international institution building, a program that 
centred on the creation of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods 
institutions, and a plethora of functional regimes governing everything 
from arms control to the prohibition of genocide. Despite the impedi-
ments imposed by four decades of Cold War, these institutions have 
evolved into a complex global architecture of institutions which can claim 
partial yet significant credit for the decline in traditional interstate 
warfare, the containment of nuclear proliferation to a handful of states, 
management of the world economy, and the prosecution of an ever more 
comprehensive humanitarian agenda. 
At the dawn of the new millennium the international system is again 
facing multiple challenges. Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War, 
superpower confrontation has been replaced by the threat of transnational 
terrorism, by colonialism’s and the Cold War’s legacy of failed or failing 
states in parts of the developing world, by new challenges to the non-
proliferation regime, by persistent global inequality and impoverishment, 
by multiple environmental crises, and by widespread human rights abuses, 
including ethnic cleansing and genocide. In the early 1990s many in the 
West hailed the emergence of a ‘new world order’, marked by the victory 
of liberalism and capitalism globally and by a new ‘governing’ consensus 
among the major powers, evident apparently in the unity of the Security 
Council at the time of the first Gulf War. This optimism has now collapsed, 
replaced by contention and confusion about how the international 
community can respond to all too palpable sources of global disorder. 
Given the centrality of the United Nations to the post-1945 international 
order, and its present entanglement in issues ranging from the use of force 
to development assistance, it is not surprising that the question of UN 
reform is receiving renewed attention. For liberal internationalists, it is axio-
matic that when sovereign states, living without a central world authority, 
face common problems, they should seek institutional solutions, and so 
their impulse is naturally toward renovating the UN system. In contrast, the 
UN’s shortcomings in the post-Cold War era have hardened, even 
radicalised, realist sceptics, who want the constraints of the UN system 
revised to more adequately reflect the dynamics of the global balance of 
power. All of this has been exacerbated by the gap between the Bush 
Administration’s animosity toward the UN and multilateralism more 
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generally and the position of most other states, which evinces ongoing 
commitment if not consistent compliance. 
In spite of these divides, the scope for effective reform of the UN is 
probably greater now than at any other point since its creation, as evident in 
Kofi Annan’s establishment of an expert committee to probe the contours of 
Security Council reform. When the United States acted without a UN 
mandate after failing to gain a second Security Council resolution licensing 
war against Iraq, many predicted the precipitous decline of the UN—the 
Security Council, it was claimed, could not agree to uphold the rule of 
international law, and it could not constrain the world’s sole remaining 
superpower. Subsequent events, however, have shown how difficult it is for 
even the United States to rebuild a state without the support of the inter-
national community through the UN. All of the major powers now have 
strong incentives to think seriously about UN reform, particularly Security 
Council reform. These immediate incentives are reinforced by a host of 
background incentives pushing in the same direction. All of the major 
functional challenges now facing the international community, from 
combating transnational terrorism and fostering global development to 
strengthening the arms control regime and preventing global warming, 
require multilateral solutions—unilateralism and bilateralism cannot solve 
them. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a renaissance in global multi-
lateralism can occur without the UN being at the centre of such a renaissance. 
This Keynote is intended to contribute to community debate about UN 
reform. We have chosen to focus on three aspects of such reform. 
Marianne Hanson takes up the central question of Security Council 
reform, looking at the needs for change, the proposals currently on the 
table, and the diverse problems facing any strategy for reform. Hilary 
Charlesworth examines reform of the UN human rights system. In recent 
years, the system has been criticised by conservative governments in the 
West, angered by the Commission on Human Rights’ willingness to 
highlight the records of ‘gold-plated democracies’, and by non-Western 
authoritarian regimes who seek to deflect criticism by claiming that 
human rights are Western, not universal, values. Charlesworth moves 
beyond this controversy to identify genuine areas for reform and to look 
at the obstacles to effective revision of the system. In the last of the three 
essays, William Maley considers the UN’s role in meeting humanitarian 
crises around the globe. During the 1990s, in response to domestic 
conflicts in the Balkans, Africa, and Southeast Asia, the UN role in this 
area has greatly expanded. Its record, however, is at best mixed. There are 
many people whose lives depend upon the continuation of UN 
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, and the UN has come to 
play a vital role in facilitating transitions to democracy. Yet its failures in 
Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda are sizeable and undeniable. Maley 
examines the challenges facing the UN in this area, explores the problems 
with current responses, and recommends a series of new initiatives.  
 
Security Council reform: Prompters, 
proposals and problems 
MARIANNE HANSON 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC) remains the world’s 
primary instrument for maintaining international peace and security. 
This is so, notwithstanding the numerous problems and challenges to its 
authority in the fifty-nine years since the creation of the UN. Calls for 
reform of the UNSC have appeared on numerous occasions; the UN’s 
Millennium Conference highlighted the issue, and a Working Group on 
Security Council Reform1 has been considering proposals for many 
years. But these calls were given an added impetus by acrimonious 
debates at the UN’s 58th Session in September 2003.  
These debates reflected, at a general level, substantial and long-
standing disaffection with UNSC voting and representational issues. At a 
more specific level, however, profound concern was expressed about the 
way in which the United States launched its invasion of Iraq in March 
2003 without explicit Security Council authorisation.2 The dissatisfaction 
in this case was not so much with voting procedures (although the US and 
Britain would undoubtedly have resented any use of the veto on this 
occasion) so much as grave concern that a key Security Council 
member—notably the US—seems increasingly unwilling to abide by the 
established rules of international society outlined and upheld by the 
Security Council. All of this has fed into renewed calls for urgent reform 
of the Council, for democratisation and transparency, and for building a 
system that cannot so easily be circumvented by the great powers.  
The circumstances of these calls were made all the more unusual by 
the fact that by September 2003, the US was in the rare position of 
being a supplicant to the UN and in clear need of this organisation 
which US President George W. Bush had earlier labelled ‘irrelevant’. 
Faced with increasing costs and casualties in his Iraq campaign and 
unable to establish effective law, order and reconstruction, Bush made a 
personal appeal to the UN to provide troops and other material 
assistance to the US. Not surprisingly, most states were cautious in 
 
 
1  This group has been labelled, rather inelegantly, the Open-ended Working Group on the 
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security 
Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. 
2  As Ramesh Thakur notes, ‘the Iraq war highlighted the gravity of structural inadequacies and 
the urgency of reform’. See Ramesh Thakur, ‘UNSC reforming the United Nations’, Daily 
Yomiuri, 24 October 2003. 
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responding to this call, but the occasion did provide the political space 
for member states to argue that this was a good opportunity for the 
international community to press the case for Security Council reform. 
Reflecting this concern, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced 
on 23 September 2003 the formation of a group of eminent persons 
tasked with making recommendations for significant UN reforms.3  
Reform—at a practical level at least—is not something generally 
associated with the Security Council; only one substantial reform has 
ever been enacted since 1945. Reflecting the dominant political and 
military structures at the end of World War Two, the Council was 
composed of eleven seats, six of which were rotating and five of which 
were permanent and carried the power of veto over any UNSC 
Resolution. These Permanent Five (P5) members were the United 
States, the Soviet Union (this seat was taken by the Russian Federation 
after the Cold War), the United Kingdom, France and China (initially 
occupied by Taiwan, this seat was subsequently given to the People’s 
Republic of China). As noted above, only once has there been 
significant change to the UNSC; this occurred in 1965 when member-
ship was expanded from eleven to fifteen seats, thus incorporating four 
extra non-permanent members, a move designed to reflect the reality of 
a greatly expanded system of states.  
Considerations of realpolitik had been paramount in negotiations 
among the wartime allies over the composition and functioning of the 
Security Council, with it being evident that great power involvement 
would require the conferring of special powers and a special status not 
available to lesser states. The veto power ensures that any resolution 
would have to attract at least nine votes out of fifteen, including the 
approval (or at least abstention) of all the P5 members. Essentially, this 
has meant that no resolution could pass unless all P5 members agreed or 
abstained; similarly, even if fourteen members of the UNSC approved a 
resolution, this could not be passed if vetoed by any one of the P5 
states.  
At the same time, however, the Charter of the UN went some way to 
dilute the potential of the veto. It indicated that all states enjoy 
 
 
3  ‘“Time is ripe” to reform UN institutions, Annan tells world leaders’, UN News Centre, 
23 September 2003, <www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=8331&Cr=reform&Cr1= 
&Kw1=reform&Kw2=security+council&Kw3>. The eminent persons group had not released 
its report at the time of writing (October 2004), however the long-standing Open-ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation released its latest report in 2004. 
Its recommendations were far from precise and direct; instead it urged, unsurprisingly, that the 
59th Session of the UN continue to consider the issue of Security Council reform. See ‘Report 
of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and 
Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security 
Council’, A/58/47 (New York: United Nations, 2004), <ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/N04/417/02/PDF/N0441702.pdf?OpenElement>. 
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sovereign equality (Article 2.1), that matters of procedure in the UNSC 
should be decided without the veto applying (Article 27.2) and that 
states, in voting on a matter under Chapter VI, must abstain from voting 
if they are a party to a dispute (Article 27.3). Even a cursory examin-
ation of UNSC activities will reveal that these provisions have done 
little to constrain the P5. It remained doubtful in any case that such 
measures could act as a serious balancer to great power self-interest. 
The Cold War ensured opposition between the P5, especially between 
the Western states (the US, UK, and France) and the Soviet Union, with 
201 resolutions falling victim to the veto between 1946 and 1990.4 And 
although the ending of the Cold War enabled unprecedented coopera-
tion between the major powers—notably over the first Gulf War and a 
number of humanitarian interventions—both the issue of the veto and of 
geographical representation on the Security Council continued to be 
matters of some concern. The inability of the US, Britain and France to 
secure a resolution authorising action against Serb forces in Kosovo in 
1999, and most recently, the clear knowledge by the US that it would 
not get approval from France, Russia, China and a large number of non-
permanent members for its campaign against Iraq in 2003, illustrated 
these difficulties. 
A CASE FOR REFORM? 
Before surveying the various proposals for reform, it is useful to give 
some thought to the extent to which reform of the Security Council may 
be necessary, and by whom it is deemed as necessary. While there is a 
reasonable degree of consensus on the need to increase the number of 
seats in the UNSC, the ‘need’ for reform of the veto is far from an 
uncontested issue. Is it for instance the case, as Russia’s representative 
has argued, that the veto is 
not a privilege, but a serious factor for ensuring consensus and 
effectiveness of Security Council decisions … the backbone of the 
coherent work of the Council, a guarantee against an arbitrariness of 
unilateral actions against the interests of the UN members, on whose 
behalf the Council acts?5
Put another way, is there something to be said for a system that seeks 
to prevent unilateral action by a dominant power intent on pursuing a 
narrow self-interest at the possible cost of destabilising wider peace and 
security? There does seem to be a case for retaining the veto when we 
consider that it was arguably the only thing that might have halted what 
 
 
4  This figure, and a general survey of UN reforms proposed by the Commission on Global 
Governance, can be found in Ingvar Carlsson, ‘The UN at 50: A time to reform’, Foreign 
Policy, 100(Fall) 1995, pp. 3–18. 
5  Cited in ‘In two-day debate, 110 member states air views on Security Council reform’, UN 
Press Release GA/9827,  <www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001117.ga9827.doc.html>. 
  
MARIANNE HANSON 
Page 6 
most UN members saw as an illegitimate invasion of Iraq by the US and 
its ‘coalition of the willing’. In the end of course, not even the veto (or 
threat of a veto) was able to curb a determined US Administration, but 
the broader point still holds: why remove the closest thing we have to a 
brake on unilateral power? The veto may have served no useful purpose 
in this instance, but its very presence is an important symbolic—and 
sometimes effective—reminder that all states are answerable to the 
broader international community and depend on the UN for legitimacy 
of their actions.  
Further questions arise: what purpose will be served by reform, and 
who stands to gain from reform? Responses here stress the need to 
modify the UN system so that it can reflect the changed patterns of 
world politics since 1945—including the need for a more democratic 
and representative Council—and so that it can effectively address the 
new kinds of security threats the world faces today. What we cannot get 
away from in this discussion is the fact that reform of the Council will 
inevitably dilute the power of the P5 at the same time as it increases 
access to and influence over the Council by a greater number of other 
states. Distributing power to a greater number of participants and 
amending decision-making practices will, in the short term, reduce P5 
power at the same time that it opens up possibilities for new states. 
Substantial obstacles will thus stand in the way of reform (even if there 
was consensus on which particular set of reforms ought to be adopted), 
the most likely of which is that without the political will of the P5 
states, very little might be achieved.  
If there is indeed virtue in the veto (or at least some virtue) and if 
reform will be structurally difficult to achieve, what then is the case for 
pursuing reform? Here, my answer is unequivocal: without substantial 
reform of the Security Council, we cannot hope to build an inclusive 
international order. And without a more equitable and inclusive 
international order, lasting solutions to a range of complex and highly 
globalised problems will in all likelihood continue to elude us. I 
concede that a case might be made for keeping the veto as a potential 
brake on unilateral actions against the interests of UN members, and 
that P5 members should use their special status and power to protect 
and act on behalf of the broader community of states (as the Russian 
delegate above noted). But I am not convinced that sufficient and 
genuine cases of this have occurred to offset the greater benefits to be 
gained from amending the voting procedure. No longer is there a 
widespread perception—if there ever was—that Security Council 
members, and especially the P5, protect and act on behalf of lesser 
states. It is precisely a rejection of this view that prompts calls for 
reform; in a world of some 192 states, the select body of the Security 
Council is no longer always seen as constituting a representative, 
legitimate or authoritative voice for the UN. What UN members want is 
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not just more seats in the Council, but importantly, a serious re-think of 
the power wielded by the P5. 
This is not to say that a democratised and more representative Security 
Council will be the answer to all ills, but the Council’s make-up and 
decision-making processes adopted in 1945 do not sit well with the 
majority of the world’s states and populations in 2004. There is, in the 
corridors of the UN and elsewhere, a sense of profound dissatisfaction 
with the workings of the UNSC. This, coupled with a growing depth of 
feeling against the West and especially against the US—notwithstanding 
that non-Western P5 members also resist reform—from many developing 
states and others angered by US foreign policy, has the potential to derail 
the rules-based international order the UN has worked so hard to create in 
the past fifty-nine years. The majority of states—including many Western 
allies—will not be prepared to tolerate indefinitely a system that con-
tinues to allow unlimited power over, and selective use of, the UN by the 
world’s largest powers. It may be stating the obvious, but the cooperation 
and consent of a large proportion of states—indeed the sense of belonging 
to a global body in which they have a stake and where they believe that 
their views are duly considered—is vital for realising a more effective and 
sustainable international security order. The reconstruction of Iraq is an 
illustrative case: had the US operation been conducted within the 
parameters of a global issue and with a greater degree of global consent, it 
is more likely that UN members would assist the US and UK in their 
present imbroglio in Iraq. 
The point here then is that while Security Council reform may entail 
some loss of power for the P5, in the longer term, inclusivity and a 
sharing of power is more likely to gain the large states the broad-based 
international support they require to meet the security challenges of this 
century. If established norms of order and justice are not seen as being 
upheld by the very powers that demand compliance of others, it is 
unlikely that even a huge military preponderance will secure the long-
term interests of individual P5 states.  
UNSC REFORM: PROPOSALS 
What then are seen as necessary reforms of the Security Council? 
Generally, there are two categories: the composition of the Council, and 
the decision-making process (often reduced to as the ‘problem of the 
veto’).  
Composition of the Council 
As noted, this aspect of Security Council reform is relatively unprob-
lematic. There is widespread agreement, even among P5 members, that 
membership of the Council should be expanded. However, there is 
disagreement over the number of new seats to be created, how 
geographical regions ought to be represented, and what status and 
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powers should be accorded to those who fill these new seats. Should 
any of the new seats be permanent? If so, should these states have the 
veto? If not, will this create a new tier of ‘standing members’ and will 
this be acceptable to other regional contenders?  
Calls have been made to expand the number of seats from the present 
fifteen up to twenty or even twenty-five. A dominant view allows for up 
to five extra permanent seats. In all likelihood these would include 
industrialised states (possibly Japan and Germany, although a strong 
case can be made that the industrialised world is already over-
represented on the Council) together with India, and a representative 
each from Africa and Latin America (possibly Nigeria and Brazil), 
although there is no clear agreement on this, with other states vying for 
representation and thus raising questions about whether these seats 
should indeed be permanent. Between two and five more rotating seats 
could be added, allowing for more representation from developing 
states. It is commonly proposed that these be drawn from Asia, Africa, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, and also from Eastern Europe.  
As mentioned above, one factor militating against the addition of 
permanent seats is the problem of regional representation. There is a 
growing realisation that the ideal envisaged in 1945 is not being met; 
states elected on a rotating basis tend invariably to pursue their 
particular interests first and their regional interests (assuming there can 
be a common regional interest) second. There is no reason to expect that 
Nigeria, Brazil or India, for example, will consider and present a purely 
regional position in their activities. Regional representation would occur 
in terms of a physical presence, but not necessarily in terms of reflecting 
a common regional position. If regional representation is something of a 
fiction, it may be more prudent for all new seats created to be rotating 
ones which are nevertheless allotted to specific regions. 
This same factor inclines against granting these states the power of 
veto. It is highly unlikely that the P5 would allow this in any case, but it 
would also set back efforts to do away with the veto and seriously 
undermine any emerging norm that seeks to limit, rather than expand, 
the use of the veto.  
Decision-making in the Council 
It is here, unsurprisingly, that most difficulties arise. However, there 
have been several very good proposals and it is not too difficult to 
imagine that some of them may be implemented. Proposals include: 
 
• A self-imposed moratorium on the use of the veto. It is envisaged 
that the P5 would mutually undertake not to use the veto for a 
specified period of time (in the first instance, say five years), unless 
there is a supreme security emergency. A period of restraint would 
go some way towards strengthening a norm of non-use, making it in 
time harder for P5 states to resort to the veto. This may be an 
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acceptable measure for P5 states which at the same time is seen by 
other states as an important step in phasing out the veto altogether. 
• Utilising a double or triple veto. Two or three P5 states, rather than 
merely one, would need to exercise their veto for a resolution to fail. 
This does not address the issue of the veto being undemocratic, but 
requiring a double or triple veto would make the procedure arguably 
‘less undemocratic’.  
• Unanimous overrule of the veto. A resolution would still be passed if 
a single P5 member vetoed it, but the remaining fourteen Council 
members united to overturn it. As with the option immediately 
above, this would prevent a single power from blocking a resolution, 
although it might be considerably harder to achieve a consensus of 
fourteen than it would be to achieve a double or triple veto. 
• Switching from the veto to a system of weighted voting. The 
permanent members would retain a degree of enhanced power, but 
this power could nevertheless be overturned by the combined weight 
of others. The system of qualified majority voting employed in the 
European Union serves as an exemplar here. In the UNSC, the P5 
may be given a vote of say, ten points, with rotating states given five 
points each. Even if a resolution was not favoured by one or two P5 
members, provided that other states could muster the political will 
and votes to oppose it, the resolution need not fail. This model 
would require attention to what the ratios between P5 and other 
states would be, whether a simple majority or other kind was 
required, what number of states would be required to vote in favour, 
and so on. The appeal of this model is that a weighted system still 
preserves the greater power of the P5 relative to other UNSC 
members; for this reason it may be a more appealing system than 
other proposals. It would continue to give more influence to the 
permanent members, but importantly, it puts a limit on that 
influence, something not present with the existing veto mechanism.  
• Limiting the use of the veto to Chapter VII enforcement operations. 
It may be possible to push for limiting the use of the veto to enforce-
ment issues only. This would limit the arbitrary and self-interested 
use of the veto, even on procedural matters, that we have seen 
before. 
There have also been calls for the P5 to be more accountable in their 
use of the veto. A sense of greater transparency in decision-making is 
seen as necessary, together with the need for dissenting P5 members to 
be called to explain and justify their use of the veto. Here, the hope is 
that by opening the process up to more accountability and transparency, 
the effect might be to curb veto use and strengthen the norm against its 
use.  
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CONCLUSION 
However straightforward and obvious the above cases may appear on 
reading, we cannot escape the fact that the P5 are unlikely to relinquish 
their special status and power easily. This is bound to be so especially in 
times where international relations are marked by turmoil and great 
insecurity, as they are at present, and where the world’s most powerful 
state prefers hierarchy to the kind of international society provided by 
the UN.6 What is achievable may be limited for some years to come. 
Ideas and proposals for UNSC reform abound, but political will and 
commitment are not yet on the horizon. It must also be remembered that 
even a reformed Security Council will remain imperfect, reflecting as it 
will the diversity and competing interests that abound in world politics.  
Yet there are indications that things are not altogether hopeless. 
Paradoxically, the recent challenge to the UNSC posed by the Iraq war 
has demonstrated the resilience of the Security Council. One need only 
think how history would have viewed the UNSC and its members if it 
had simply caved in and authorised what the majority felt to be an 
illegitimate use of force against Iraq. The bypassing of that body has 
also made the international community more rather than less keen to 
defend the UN. The US decision not to use the Security Council has 
resulted in a renewal of calls to limit the conditions under which the 
Council can be held hostage to veto by the Permanent Five members. 
While the US had labelled the UN as inefficient and irrelevant and 
called for a more streamlined and decisive body, it is the call for 
limitations to the power held by the P5 that is more prevalent today. In 
other words, by not using the UN, the US has increased rather than 
decreased the international community’s determination to keep the UN 
as the principal mechanism for addressing security issues, and to 
cushion it from great power misuse. It may be that the greatest blow to 
the UNSC has opened up possibilities for the construction of a more 
politically inclusive ‘international space’ than existed previously. 
Reform of the Security Council represents an opportunity for the UN to 
create a more equitable and sustainable world order, something that will 
surely be needed as we seek to address complex and pressing challenges 
to global security.  
 
 
6  See Tim Dunne, ‘Society and hierarchy in international relations’, International Relations, 
17(3) 2003, pp. 303–20. 
 
The United Nation’s human rights system 
HILARY CHARLESWORTH 
WHAT IS THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM? 
The United Nation’s human rights system is a complex and convoluted 
set of mechanisms. It consists of two ‘families’ of institutions: bodies 
created by the UN Charter and those created by various UN human 
rights treaties. The former category includes both political bodies such 
as the Commission on Human Rights, to which states are elected as 
members, and expert bodies such as the Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, whose members are elected 
as individual experts. The role of the Charter bodies includes standard-
setting (for example, preparing new treaties or declarations on human 
rights), responding to human rights violations and promoting human 
rights. The Commission on Human Rights also has the capacity to 
appoint Special Rapporteurs on particular human rights issues or on 
particular countries. The latter category of institutions comprises seven 
committees created by some of the major UN human rights treaties.1 
The members of these committees are elected by the UN General 
Assembly, but are considered independent human rights experts. The 
role of the human rights treaty bodies is to monitor the implementation 
of the treaties by states that have become parties to them. The primary 
monitoring method is through scrutiny, comment on and discussion of 
periodic implementation reports submitted by states parties to the 
treaties. Treaty bodies produce valuable compilations of jurisprudence, 
known as general comments or general recommendations, on the scope 
of particular human rights. Four of the committees also consider 
complaints from individuals about states’ failure to implement their 
treaty commitments. 
 
 
1  The human rights treaty bodies are the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, created by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination; the Human Rights Committee, created by the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, created by the 
UN Economic and Social Council to monitor the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; the Committee against Torture, created by the Convention against 
Torture; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, created by the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, created by the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
and the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families, created by the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families. 
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PROBLEMS 
Criticism of the UN human rights system comes from all directions. The 
Charter bodies are often regarded as inefficient and as having done little 
to improve the observance of human rights. A recent study of the 
Commission on Human Rights, for example, recommended streamlining 
the Commission’s agenda and business, although it also acknowledged 
that the intensely political context of the Commission’s work inevitably 
affected its efficacy.2 The study noted that states sometimes seek 
membership of the Commission as a strategy to prevent criticism of their 
own serious human rights abuses. It however rejected a proposal that 
states could not be elected to the Commission unless they met specific 
human rights criteria on the basis that this would increase the 
politicisation of that body.  
The system of UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies has also 
been strongly criticised. It is cumbersome and inefficient in many ways. 
Parties to the human rights treaties often submit the required reports on 
treaty implementation late and in unsatisfactory form. Report prepara-
tion is a considerable demand, especially on developing countries, and 
there is repetition and overlap in the reporting requirements of the seven 
different committees. In turn, the treaty-monitoring committees have 
been slow in considering reports and some have disorganised practices. 
Follow-up of human rights violations tends to be haphazard. These 
bodies are part-time and members receive token payment for their work. 
The bureaucratic support for the committees is minimal. The quality of 
the work of various committees is variable and the independence of 
many of the committee members is compromised by the fact that they 
are, or recently have been, government employees.  
A series of reports prepared by a distinguished Australian jurist, 
Professor Philip Alston, for the UN Secretary-General in 1989, 1993 
and 1997 focused on the shortcomings of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies. Alston observed that the system was able to function only 
because of the ‘continuing delinquency of states’ in either ignoring their 
reporting obligations or performing them late. He proposed the creation 
of a single expert monitoring body in place of the then six (now seven) 
specialist committees, and the proper resourcing of such a committee.3 
 
 
2  Walter Kälin and Cecilia Jimenez, ‘Reform of the UN Commission on Human Rights’ 
(Bern/Geneva: Institute of Public Law, University of Bern, 30 August 2003), 
<www.oefre.unibe.ch/oe-forsc.htm>. 
3  Effective implementation of international instruments on human rights, including reporting 
obligations under international instruments on human rights: Note, UN Doc. A/44/668 (New 
York: United Nations, 8 November 1989); Status of preparation of publications, studies and 
documents for the World Conference: #World Conference on Human Rights: Note, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.11/Rev.1 (Geneva: United Nations, 22 April 1993); Effective 
functioning of bodies established pursuant to United Nations human rights instruments: Note, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (Geneva: United Nations, 27 March 1997). 
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No action has yet been taken on Alston’s conclusions and recom-
mendations although the number of overdue reports to the treaty bodies 
is over 1000. More recently, a Canadian scholar, Professor Anne 
Bayefsky, has published a major study of the UN human rights treaty 
body system.4 She made a range of suggestions for reform including 
consolidating the reporting duties of states and the reporting functions 
of the treaty bodies, ensuring that treaty-monitoring bodies are truly 
independent and providing adequate resources for the system. Amnesty 
International issued a set of proposals to strengthen the human rights 
treaty bodies in September 2003.5
AUSTRALIA’S CRITIQUE OF THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
Governments—the primary subjects of criticism by all parts of the UN 
human rights structure—have also censured the system. Australia was 
elected chair of the Commission on Human Rights in 2004 and Mike 
Smith, the Australian Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, 
has made some interesting proposals to reform that body. He has 
suggested for example that all members of the UN should be members 
of the Commission. This would give greater legitimacy to the 
Commission’s work and streamline the current cumbersome process in 
which the General Assembly’s Third Committee reviews the work of 
the Commission. Ambassador Smith has also proposed reducing the 
number of agenda items to allow more substantive debate.6  
The major object of governmental critique however has been the 
human rights treaty body structure, perhaps because the treaty bodies 
are formally independent of control by states and less susceptible to 
political influences than the Charter bodies. Australia has taken a 
leading role in devising a state-centred program of reform of the UN 
treaty body system. The Australian initiative appeared to be prompted 
by comments critical of Australia by three of the treaty-monitoring 
bodies in 1999 and 2000: the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, the Committee against Torture and the Human Rights 
Committee. The Committees expressed particular concern with the 
situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia and the mandatory 
detention of asylum seekers. After a tense meeting of the Minister for 
Immigration, Philip Ruddock, with the Committee on the Elimination 
 
 
4  Anne F. Bayefsky, ‘The UN human rights treaty system: Universality at the crossroads’, 
18 April 2001, <www.bayefsky.com/report/finalreport.pdf>. 
5  Amnesty International, ‘United Nations: Proposals to strengthen the human rights treaty 
bodies’, September 2003, <web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400182003?open&of=-
ENG-375>. 
6  Mike Smith, ‘The UN Commission on Human Rights: Reflections on a year as chair’, address 
delivered at the Centre for International and Public Law, Faculty of Law, Australian National 
University, Canberra, 31 August 2004. 
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of Racial Discrimination in Geneva in 2000, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs (Alexander Downer), the Attorney-General (Daryl Williams) 
and Ruddock issued a joint press release announcing a review of 
Australia’s participation in the United Nations human rights system.7  
The August 2000 press release offers the fullest available account of 
the Australian international human rights reform agenda.8 Information 
about the method or content of Australia’s review is difficult to obtain. 
No terms of reference for the review were issued and no submissions 
called for. The outcomes of the review were not publicly available. The 
secretive nature of the review seemed inconsistent with the Australian 
government’s reforms to the treaty-making process in 1996, when it 
declared that participation in treaties should not be the preserve of the 
executive, but subject to the scrutiny of the legislature and involving 
consultation with the public. 
Although the press release stated that Australia would take ‘strong 
measures’ to improve the effectiveness of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies, its overall tone implied that ‘reform’ required winding back the 
UN role in human rights monitoring. The Ministers referred to the need to 
‘ensure adequate recognition of the primary role of democratically elected 
governments and the subordinate role of non-government organisations’ 
in the human rights system.9 Governments of necessity play a primary 
role in human rights protection through enacting laws. But the implication 
of the government’s statements seemed to be that, if a government is 
democratically elected, it can be relied on always to protect consistently 
the rights of its inhabitants. As the philosopher Ronald Dworkin has 
pointed out, however, the very basis of human rights is the protection of 
minorities against the will of the majority in certain defined areas.10 
While the democratic political card game should usually be run along 
majoritarian lines, a civilised society needs to protect particular rights of 
minorities. For example, a majority of Australians may profess 
Christianity, but it would go against our ideas of tolerance if an Australian 
government attempted to ban all other faiths. While non-democratic 
governments by definition are in breach of their citizens’ human rights, 
they are not alone. Democratically elected governments also regularly 
violate human rights—decades of decisions by the European Court of 
Human Rights against the United Kingdom testify to this. Prime Minister 
John Howard himself has not refrained from criticising the actions of the 
 
 
  7  ‘Improving the effectiveness of United Nations Committees’, Joint Media Release FA97, 
29 August 2000, <www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreign/2000/fa097_2000.html>. 
  8  See also ‘Australian initiative to reform the UN Treaty Committees: Frequently asked 
questions’, <www.dfat.gov.au/un/untreaty_faq.html>. 
  9  ‘Improving the effectiveness of United Nations Committees’. 
10 Ronald Dworkin, Taking rights seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), p. 205. 
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democratically elected government of Malaysia in relation to the Anwar 
Ibrahim trial. Governments, even ‘gold-plated democracies’,11 have little 
interest in exposing their own human rights breaches. Without a robust 
culture of scrutiny and debate, often led by human rights non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), many human rights issues would 
remain covered up. 
The Australian announcement of a reform agenda took the para-
doxical approach of improving the UN human rights system by 
distancing Australia from it. The rationale of the reporting system is to 
promote ‘constructive dialogue’ between the committees and the 
countries concerned. Australia’s reform policy appears designed to 
avoid a genuine dialogue by limiting cooperation with the UN. The 
August 2000 press release referred to a decision to take a more 
‘economical and selective’ approach to reporting under the human 
rights treaties.12 Given Australia is typically very late with its reports, it 
is not clear what further economies might entail. Another aspect of the 
reform program outlined by the three Ministers was a decision that 
Australia would not become a party to the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women. The Protocol would have allowed direct complaints about non-
implementation of that treaty to be made to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
The August 2000 press release also announced a general rejection of 
visits to Australia by the treaty committees, unless the government 
considers there is a compelling reason, a tactic made familiar by 
countries such as North Korea and China. Critics of the UN system 
have argued that Australia has been dealt with more harshly by the 
treaty bodies than overt and systematic abusers of human rights. As 
proof of this tendency, Prime Minister Howard noted in Parliament that 
the number of recommendations made by particular human rights treaty 
bodies to Cuba and China in a particular year was less than the number 
made to Australia. This is a simplistic and inappropriate measurement: 
the important indicator of course is not the number of recommendations 
made, but the actual content of the recommendations. On such a 
criterion, it is clear from reading the human rights committees’ reports 
that Australia has not been singled out for particular opprobrium. 
What progress has Australia’s international campaign for treaty body 
reform made? Australia has sponsored workshops at the UN involving 
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, members 
of the treaty bodies and some thirty countries. The conclusions of these 
 
 
11  Attorney-General Daryl Williams’ description of Australia in 2000. 
12  ‘Improving the effectiveness of United Nations Committees’. 
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workshops are not available but the problems of the human rights treaty 
bodies have now attracted increasing attention from the UN General 
Assembly and from NGOs. Progress has been rather slow however. One 
problematic development in 2003 was the reduction of treaty committee 
members’ already modest stipend to the sum of US$1 per annum, 
undermining the goal of independence of committee members.  
The restricted information available suggests the Australian initiative 
for reform of the UN human rights treaty bodies was initially limited 
because of its focus on protecting state sovereignty. ‘Efficiency’ and 
‘effectiveness’ often appear as code words for reducing criticism of the 
human rights records of developed countries. While it is clear that the 
system is in need of serious attention, the initiative needs to move to 
address the significant issues of competence and impact. The political 
rhetoric attacking the UN human rights system appears to have reduced 
in the last year and there are signs that the Australian initiative may now 
provide useful pressure on the UN human rights system to itself 
scrutinise its working procedures. 
The problems of the human rights treaty bodies can be grouped under 
the following headings. 
Encouraging state participation in the human rights system 
Some major international players, such as the United States, have been 
reluctant to participate in international human rights treaties. Many 
states that are party to human rights treaties have attached formal 
reservations, or exceptions, to their commitments, reducing the scope of 
international scrutiny. 
Procedures 
The multiplication of reporting requirements on states is inefficient and 
leads to frustration with the reporting process. Follow-up to comments 
on reports by the treaty bodies is limited. 
Quality of committee members 
Members are regularly elected to committees without background or 
experience in human rights. Some members retain very close links with 
their government, compromising the appearance of independence. 
Resources 
The reporting system has been consistently under-resourced, as has the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights generally. With a 
reduction in central budgetary allocation, voluntary contributions now 
comprise two-thirds of the Office’s budget, leading to states earmarking 
contributions for particular projects rather than for core funding. 
These problems suggest a broader agenda for UN human rights treaty 
body reform that could be usefully taken up by Australia and other 
countries. As Alston proposed almost a decade ago, a major step 
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forward would be the creation of a single human rights treaty-
monitoring body. Although this would mean the loss of the expertise 
and focus of particular treaty committees, a single body would allow a 
more co-ordinated approach to dealing with human rights concerns. In 
June 2004 the chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies adopted 
draft guidelines for the production of an expanded ‘core document’ on 
human rights by states and harmonised guidelines on reporting to the 
treaty bodies.13 These developments may foreshadow an eventual move 
to a single human rights report from states. NGOs should be able to 
have regular contact with the body and the opportunity to offer 
comment on state reports. The human rights treaty-monitoring com-
mittee should be a full-time institution with a properly staffed secretariat 
to enable the efficient processing and consideration of state party 
reports and the creation of effective follow-up mechanisms. Members of 
the committee should be independent of government and not on leave 
from government service. The imbalance in representation of women 
and men in the committees should be addressed. The process for 
nominating members should include statements of compatibility of 
nominees with established criteria of competence, experience, expertise 
and independence. States parties could provide a single report on 
implementation of its human rights treaty obligations, thus reducing the 
possibility of overdue and poor quality reports. Finally, any serious 
approach to reform requires an adequate budgetary commitment. The 
human rights system should be primarily funded through regular 
allocations rather than relying on voluntary contributions. The imple-
mentation of these reforms could assist in reviving the rather creaky UN 
human rights edifice. 
 
 
13  Guidelines on an expanded core document and treaty-specific targeted reports and 
harmonized guidelines on reporting under the international human rights treaties: Report of 
the Secretariat, UN Doc. HRI/MC/2004/3 (Geneva: United Nations, 9 June 2004). 
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At 4.30 pm on 19 August 2003, a flatbed truck carrying 1000 kilograms 
of high explosives was detonated by a suicide bomber in a service road 
adjacent to the Baghdad Headquarters of the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq. Among those killed in the blast was Arthur C. Helton, 
Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York and one 
of the most penetrating and insightful commentators on the dilemmas of 
humanitarian action in the post-Cold War world. In 2002, he had 
warned that the ‘international system for delivering humanitarian assist-
ance to needy populations around the world is badly fragmented’.1 It 
was therefore a tragic irony that he died while investigating the roles 
that the United Nations could play in the aftermath of an invasion which 
itself had badly fragmented the understandings on which effective 
multilateral action depends. 
The United Nations was founded in the aftermath of the most 
catastrophic conflict that the world had ever known, and the lives of 
countless millions at that very moment were in disarray. Thus, the UN 
was charged very early in its own life with coping with humanitarian 
challenges and with the need to develop appropriate structures for 
addressing them. The Economic and Social Council established by 
Chapter X of the Charter of the United Nations was viewed as a major 
innovation, although in the immediate pre-war period, the League of 
Nations had taken some steps in this direction in the light of recom-
mendations from a committee headed by Stanley Bruce. However, the 
following five decades were to highlight the importance of flexibility in 
the face of diverse challenges, and for a range of reasons, the UN 
system on occasion proved notably flat-footed. It is with the character 
of these challenges, and the appropriateness of UN responses, that the 
remainder of this essay is concerned. 
HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES 
In recent years there has been a great deal written about ‘complex 
humanitarian emergencies’, but as Fiona Terry has pointed out, 
humanitarian emergencies have always been complex, and to the extent 
that things have changed in recent years, it has been in the intensity of 
the demands upon agencies and institutions to respond expeditiously 
and effectively. ‘It is the international response’, she argues, ‘that is 
 
 
1  Arthur C. Helton, The price of indifference: Refugees and humanitarian action in the new 
century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 223. 
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more “complex”; proliferation in the number and type of actors in the 
field has exacerbated inherent dilemmas in the provision of humani-
tarian assistance’.2 It is also tempting to see the involvement of the UN 
in internal conflicts as a recent development, but that too is a suspect 
conclusion, as those who recall the Congolese crisis of 1960–63 would 
recognise. Rather, when one surveys the history of the UN, one 
witnesses a mixture of institutionalised and ad hoc responses to 
problems, with the level of initial understanding of a problem’s 
complexity varying considerably. A number of specific cases help to 
highlight the nature of these problems. 
Some forms of humanitarian challenge arise from territorial division. 
One of the early issues to confront the UN, one inherited from the 
League of Nations mandate system, was that of Palestine. The turbulent 
circumstances of the birth of the state of Israel and the population 
displacements which accompanied it left a legacy of hatred and despair 
which continues to haunt both the political and humanitarian agendas of 
the UN. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established in 1949, is one of the 
longest-standing UN relief agencies, and its activities are now integrally 
related to the mythologies of the Palestinian population. Bodies such as 
UNRWA can hardly play more than an ameliorative role. In this respect, 
UNRWA differs markedly from the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has a general protective 
mandate in respect of refugees, and is much more heavily involved in 
promoting so-called ‘durable solutions’ to refugee problems.3 However, 
as the more recent case of the breakup of Yugoslavia demonstrates, even 
a body such as UNHCR may have limited scope to shape the wider 
context within which humanitarian catastrophes unfold. 
Of course, refugee movements are often symptoms of deeper 
problems of state disruption, which may create an apparently urgent 
need for humanitarian assistance. This was well illustrated by the case 
of Somalia. In the preamble to Security Council Resolution 767 of 
27 July 1992, the Council recognised ‘that the provision of humani-
tarian assistance in Somalia is an important element in the effort of the 
Council to restore international peace and security in the area’. Here one 
sees a certain ingenuity at work. Article 2.7 of the Charter provides that 
nothing in the Charter ‘shall authorize the United Nations to intervene 
 
 
2  Fiona Terry, ‘Reconstituting whose social order? NGOs in disrupted states’, in William 
Maley, Charles Sampford and Ramesh Thakur (eds), From civil strife to civil society: Civil 
and military responsibilities in disrupted states (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
2003), pp. 279–99, at p. 280. 
3  On UNRWA, see Robert Bowker, Palestinian refugees: Mythology, identity, and the search 
for peace (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003). On UNHCR, see Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and 
world politics: A perilous path (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state’, but an exception to this is to be found in Chapter VII, which 
permits enforcement action to ‘restore international peace and security’. 
Thus, by wording its resolution as it did, the Security Council implicitly 
brought humanitarian assistance within its mandate. The outcome in 
Somalia was not exactly a happy one, and this highlighted another 
serious challenge for the UN: restoring order in disrupted states is an 
exceptionally difficult and time-consuming undertaking, and may 
require considerably more patience than key states are capable of 
displaying.4
In the case of Somalia, the UN’s involvement came at a time when 
there was a relatively high degree of optimism about the potential fruits 
of multilateral action. US President George Bush (1989–93) had spoken 
in visionary terms of a possible ‘new world order’, and in his 1992 
report An agenda for peace, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali had called for the UN to consider a wider range of activities than 
simply classical peacekeeping as instruments for the prevention of 
conflict.5 This optimism did not last long, for several reasons. First, the 
early 1990s witnessed a burst of intense internal conflicts which 
significantly stretched the resources of the UN system. Second, as major 
powers found themselves preoccupied with challenges such as the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia, it proved difficult for other trouble spots to 
secure their attention. Thus, instead of being able to proceed proactively 
with adequate support from member states, the UN found itself 
increasingly confronted with the demand to clean up messes not of its 
own making. The frustrations which accumulated during the 1990s 
found voice in the blunt language of the 2000 Brahimi Report,6 which 
warned against entanglement in ill-conceived operations. However, this 
is easier said than done. For example, despite the dubious legality of the 
US-led ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in March and April 2003,7 the UN 
nonetheless was drawn into the provision of an Assistance Mission, 
largely because of pressure from the US. It took the killings of 
19 August 2003 to drive Brahimi’s warnings home. It is much easier to 
be a spoiler than a builder, and the old norms that protected 
 
 
4  See William Maley, ‘Twelve theses on the impact of humanitarian intervention’, Security 
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2003. 
 
The humanitarian imperative 
Page 21 
humanitarian workers are breaking down. They are not so much angels 
of mercy as soft targets. 
In the worst of circumstances, the UN is confronted with wholesale 
slaughter. The cases of Cambodia from 1975 to 1978, and Rwanda in 
1994, saw millions killed in the face of an ‘international community’ 
that did nothing of benefit in response to the victims’ cries. The failings 
of the UN in cases such as these, and in more limited but nonetheless 
agonising atrocities such as the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and the 1999 
slayings in East Timor following the announcement of the results of a 
UN-run popular consultation on independence, have been documented 
in distressing detail,8 and it should therefore be repeated, in the UN’s 
defence, that it has no military force of its own and confronted with 
humanitarian challenges on a genocidal scale, it is entirely dependent 
upon the willingness of member states to take prompt action. One of the 
more unseemly spectacles of the 1990s was the gusto with which US 
political figures blamed the UN, and specifically the Secretary-General, 
for action which the US had given prior approval in the Security 
Council, or inaction resulting from the known reluctance of the US to 
support the kind of response required. Rwanda was one of the worst 
examples of the latter situation, as Samantha Power has documented in 
searing detail.9  
What unites all these cases is the political element. Natural disasters 
can occur where political factors play no role (although ostensibly 
‘natural’ disasters such as fires or mudslides may actually be a product 
more of inappropriate past policy decisions—on issues such as forest 
management—than of ‘nature’ on the rampage). But in most cases 
where the UN’s humanitarian agencies are drawn in, political factors are 
plainly at play. And from this a sobering implication arises. If root 
causes of humanitarian problems are political, then the only solutions 
that are likely to prove durable will be political as well. The provision of 
humanitarian relief on its own is unlikely to address these root causes; 
indeed, it may have severe unintended consequences, the worst of 
which is the sustaining of unappetising political forces as occurred in 
refugee camps in Zaire after the Rwandan genocide, when génocidaires 
actually found sanctuary. Here we see in stark form the paradox of 
humanitarian action, to which Terry and other writers have recently 
 
 
8  See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: 
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devoted considerable attention.10 This can create acute tensions within 
the UN system, for the ‘constitutional mechanisms’ to ensure that relief 
does not aggravate political problems are weak. On occasion, different 
parts of the UN system have sent inconsistent signals to actors on the 
ground; this occurred in Afghanistan in May 1998, when a UN relief 
official actually signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Taliban which provided that ‘women’s access to health and education 
will need to be gradual’.11 Here, the humanitarian imperative to deliver 
relief overwhelmed basic common sense, which suggested that it was 
not a good idea to contradict in writing some of the key principles of 
gender equality which the UN system had been fostering. 
RESPONSES 
When looking at the UN’s response to humanitarian challenges, it is 
important first of all to recognise that the UN has some splendid 
achievements to its credit. Its successes in providing succour to 
refugees, often with very little notice and limited cash resources, is 
remarkable. UNHCR, for example, helps around twenty million people, 
but has a total staff of only just over 5000. It is anything but a bloated 
bureaucracy. Too often, member states casually dump huge problems in 
the lap of the UN: Kosovo comes immediately to mind.12 There are 
many outstanding staff on the UN’s payroll, and without their 
dedication and commitment, countless evils of the world might never 
have been confronted. Those who scorn the UN should think of foot-
soldiers of UN activity such as UNHCR’s Bettina Goislard, who was 
callously murdered by the Taliban in the Afghan town of Ghazni on 
16 November 2003 while working to help Afghans rebuild their lives. 
Some problems, for some people at least, can be ameliorated through 
well-crafted action. 
The UN has also sought to fine-tune its mechanisms for the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance. In 1991, General Assembly Resolution 
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46/182 set out a mechanism for the raising of funds through con-
solidated appeals. This continues to the present, and on 18 November 
2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan launched the 2004 appeal, seeking 
US$3 billion for forty-five million people in twenty-one countries. The 
appeal, as usual, was the product of work in the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The OCHA is headed 
by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, a senior official directly 
responsible to the Secretary-General. Resolution 46/182 called for joint 
inter-agency needs assessment missions in response to requests for 
emergency assistance. 
Nonetheless, on occasions things have gone horribly wrong. The 
UN’s inability to choke off the Rwandan genocide will forever stain its 
reputation. This case was one in which the indifference of key states 
was matched by the wariness of the UN Secretariat about becoming 
involved in a situation which could turn into another Somalia. As a 
result, not only were vast numbers of Rwandans killed by ethnic Hutu 
extremists, but the UN’s own Force Commander—a truly heroic 
Canadian, General Roméo Dallaire—was forced to bear witness to an 
orgy of killing which he was not authorised to stop. To deal with this 
problem was far beyond the capacity of Dallaire’s foot-soldiers, and the 
case highlights the structural weakness of the UN in dealing with large-
scale political problems which no great power has a great interest in 
solving.13
CHANGE 
If such problems are to be overcome, some attention needs to be given 
to the architecture of humanitarian assistance. Resolution 46/182 was an 
important step in the right direction, but it remains the case that the UN 
system is constitutionally fragmented in areas where effective coordina-
tion is required. The biannual meetings of the United Nations System 
Chief Executives Board for Coordination highlight the ongoing problem 
of a multiplicity of Chief Executives rather than a single one. There is 
no prospect of the UN Specialised Agencies (such as the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization and United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) or even the 
UN Funds and Programs (such as United Nations Development 
Programme, UNHCR, World Food Programme and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund) being drawn back into the Secretariat, and from time 
to time problems of coordination will surface as a result. A more severe 
problem relates to resources. Whereas the UN Secretariat is financed 
from the dues paid by member states, the vital activities of UNHCR are 
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almost entirely funded from voluntary contributions. As UNHCR has 
been increasingly driven into large-scale emergency relief operations, it 
has on occasion met with the displeasure of key donors as it attempts to 
discharge its other function of offering protection to refugees and 
asylum seekers in those donor countries. Separating the function of 
refugee protection in the strict sense from that of providing emergency 
relief to displaced populations might be a step in the right direction, but 
there is no indication that anything like this is about to occur.14
There is also a serious global problem of resources for addressing 
humanitarian problems, and a fashionable new emergency or political 
crisis can easily ‘crowd out’ a much needier ‘at-risk’ population. Here, 
the situation in Afghanistan is instructive. After the signing of the Bonn 
Agreement in December 2001, there was a great deal of optimism that 
Afghanistan might at last have turned the corner, but also a desperate 
need for further measures to ensure that the momentum created in Bonn 
would not be lost. Yet unfortunately this was exactly what happened. 
With a view to conserving air-lift assets for future use against Iraq, the 
US responded dustily to suggestions that the new International Security 
Assistance Force be extended beyond Kabul,15 and funds pledged for 
Afghanistan at a January 2002 Donors’ Conference in Tokyo simply 
failed to materialise. The scale of the problem can be appreciated from 
work carried out by the Center on International Cooperation at New 
York University.16 Figures compiled from the Government of 
Afghanistan Donor Assistance Database showed that by November 
2003, while US$5.37 billion had been ‘committed’, the amount spent on 
‘projects begun’ was only US$1.78 billion (of which US$378.87 million 
was for the Afghan National Army), and the amount spent on completed 
projects was a mere US$112.5 million. And while the Administration of 
George W. Bush trumpeted its intention to deliver further aid to 
Afghanistan, its actual behaviour belied its rhetoric. As Ivo Daalder and 
James Lindsay recorded, the ‘White House’s 2004 budget submission 
failed to include any funds for Afghan reconstruction’,17 and the 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Reconstruction of 
 
 
14  See William Maley, ‘A new tower of Babel? Reappraising the architecture of refugee 
protection’, in Edward Newman and Joanne Van Selm (eds), Refugees and forced 
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15  See Alan Sipress, ‘Peacekeepers won’t go beyond Kabul, Cheney says’, Washington Post, 
20 March 2002. 
16  See Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada and Abby Stoddard, ‘Through the fog of peace 
building: Evaluating the reconstruction of Afghanistan’ (New York: Center on International 
Cooperation, New York University, June 2003); and ‘Afghanistan aid flows as of November 
2003’ (New York: Center on International Cooperation, New York University, June 2003). 
17  Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America unbound: The Bush revolution in foreign 
policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 114. 
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Iraq and Afghanistan of November 2003 approved just US$1.2 billion 
for Afghanistan, out of a total of US$87.5 billion. (By contrast, the 
amount for relief and reconstruction in Iraq was US$18.6 billion.) The 
UN simply has little say in what will be spent on humanitarian 
operations, and how. 
Most serious of all is the problem of security. Humanitarian action is 
most often required in an environment rich with spoilers. On 2 July 
2003, President Bush responded to threats to US forces in Iraq with the 
words ‘bring ’em on’. Rarely can such a reckless plea have passed the 
lips of a prominent leader, and in the months that followed, spoilers 
lined up to meet his request. Many US soldiers died in the attacks which 
followed, but so did staff of the two leading humanitarian missions in 
Iraq, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In 
Afghanistan, the resurgence of Taliban groups, operating out of bases in 
Pakistan, created a similar climate of insecurity. In the long-run, 
security sector reform, encompassing both military and police, may be 
required to provide a firm basis for future stability, but it offers no short-
term palliative. Thus, if humanitarian action is to succeed, a neutral 
security force of adequate size and with a ‘Chapter VII’ mandate may 
be required—not to carry out humanitarian action itself, which can 
dangerously blur the distinction between aid workers and combatants, 
but to secure an environment in which humanitarian action can proceed.  
If the 1990s were not easy for the UN, they were not easy for 
humanitarian action either. While earlier crises such as the Biafran 
emergency had brought the paradoxes of humanitarianism into focus, it 
was in the 1990s that they appeared in a deluge. And ultimately, there is 
no magic solution to the dilemmas which haunt contemporary 
humanitarian action. In modern humanitarianism, the tension between 
deontological and consequentialist ethics is fully on display. David 
Rieff in a recent discussion has argued that it is necessary for humani-
tarian action to recover its independence. Humanitarianism, he has 
argued, ‘is neutral or it is nothing’.18 His observations are based on both 
extensive field experience and deep reflection, and deserve to be taken 
seriously. Yet if neutrality is necessary for humanitarian effectiveness, it 
is scarcely achievable within the framework of an integrated UN system 
with the Security Council in charge. Improving the efficiency of relief 
delivery does not begin to come to terms with this deeper structural and 
conceptual tension. The best, therefore, for which one can hope is an 
uneasy and compromising balancing of the UN’s political and 
humanitarian responsibilities. 
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